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ALTRUISM, MARKETS, AND ORGAN
PROCUREMENT
JULIA D. MAHONEY*
I
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the dominant view among biomedical ethicists, transplantation
professionals, and the public at large has been that altruism, not financial
considerations, should motivate organ donors. Proposals to compensate sources
of transplantable organs or their survivors, although endorsed by a number of
economists and legal scholars,1 have been denounced as unethical and
impracticable.2 Organ transplantation is said to belong to the world of gift, as
distinct from the market realm. Paying for organs would inject commerce into a
sphere where market values have no place and would transform a system based
on generosity and civic spirit into one of antiseptic, bargained-for exchanges.3
Today, this long-standing commitment to altruistic procurement is under
severe pressure. The growing understanding that organ transplantation is a
lucrative business has spurred many to question a system that insists organ
providers go unpaid while hospitals, physicians, and others reap financial
returns.4 Moreover, the strict ban on compensation fits uneasily with the
notion—widely embraced in the wake of the collapse of communism in Eastern
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1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE 219–36 (1997); A.H. Barnett et al., Improving Organ Donation: Compensation Versus Markets,
29 INQUIRY 372 (1992); James F. Blumstein, The Case for Commerce in Organ Transplantation, 24
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2190 (1992); Lloyd Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Organs: The Virtues of
a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989).
2. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? THE ETHICAL FRONTIERS OF
BIOMEDICINE 95–96 (1997); NICHOLAS L. TILNEY, TRANSPLANT: FROM MYTH TO REALITY 267–74
(2003).
3. See, e.g., Thomas Murray, Organ Vendors, Families and the Gift of Life, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES 120–23 (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 1996); see also
Gil Siegel & Richard Bonnie, Closing the Organ Gap: A Reciprocity-Based Social Contract Approach,
34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 415, 415–16 (2006).
4. See MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 6–
20 (2006); Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 176–85 (2000).
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Europe and the former Soviet Union—that, as a general rule, market exchanges
further social welfare.5 Most important, under the current system the gap
between the supply and demand of transplantable organs shows little or no sign
of abating.6 The failures or limited successes of “required request” laws
mandating that families of potential organ providers be approached about
donation, public-information campaigns, and other policy initiatives designed to
remedy the organ shortage militate for aggressive exploration of all options,
including financial rewards.
This exploration is starting to take place. In the past five years, leading
academic journals and university presses have published a stream of books and
articles arguing that—at least in some circumstances—financial incentives for
organ sources offer a morally acceptable and potentially effective means of
augmenting the organ supply.7 Opinion pieces critical of the ban on
compensation for organ providers now appear regularly in the mainstream
press.8 And in testimony before Congress, a representative of the American
Medical Association, an organization once implacably opposed to
compensation, advocated further study of financial rewards for deceased
donors.9
The groundswell of interest in financial incentives brings into sharp relief
the question whether the time has come to abandon the societal commitment to
uncompensated organ procurement. The answer, I argue, is a tentative “yes.”
5. See generally MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE IDEAS THAT CONQUERED THE WORLD: PEACE,
DEMOCRACY AND FREE MARKETS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004).
6. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION
1–3 (2006) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT] (demonstrating the “widening gap between
the supply of transplantable organs and the number of patients on the waiting list” by examining the
number of transplants and number of candidates on the waiting list from 1995 to 2004); Michele
Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics and Private Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 600 (2007)
(“The evidence, including growing waitlists and thousands of deaths each year, informs us that altruistic
organ procurement remains an ineffective approach to meet the growing demand for organs.”).
7. See, e.g., MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER: HUMAN ORGANS,
TRANSPLANTATION, AND THE MARKET (2005); JAMES STACEY TAYLOR, STAKES AND KIDNEYS:
WHY MARKETS IN HUMAN BODY PARTS ARE MORALLY IMPERATIVE (2005); Abdallah S. Daar, The
Case for a Regulated System of Living Kidney Sales, 2 NATURE CLINICAL PRAC. NEPHROLOGY 600
(2006); Amy L. Friedman, Payments for Living Organ Donation Should Be Legalised, 33 BRIT. MED. J.
746 (2006); Benjamin E. Hippen, In Defense of a Regulated Market in Kidneys from Living Vendors, 30
J. MED. & PHIL. 593 (2005); Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor)
Kidneys: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216 (2004); A.P. Monaco,
Rewards for Organ Donation: The Time Has Come, 69 KIDNEY INT’L 955 (2006); Robert M. Veatch,
Why Liberals Should Accept Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
19 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Consider Incentives to Boost Ranks of Organ Donors, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2003, at
14A; Guy Darst, Organ of Change: Time to Allow Legal Kidney Sales, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 18,
2007, at 023; Russell Korobkin, Sell an Organ, Save a Life?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at M5; Sally
Satel, Death’s Waiting List, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at A21.
9. Assessing Incentives to Increase Organ Donations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 51 (2003) (statement of
Robert M. Sade, Professor of Surgery, Medical University of South Carolina and Member, American
Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs).
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Caution is warranted not because the arguments marshaled against
compensating organ donors are convincing: they are not. Rather, the need for
deliberateness stems from the complex challenges of moving from a
procurement system based on appeals to generosity to one that draws on a
wider set of motivations. These challenges extend beyond overcoming or
moderating the strong feelings of “repugnance” that the prospect of paying
organ sources elicits in many.10 Providing compensation to organ sources would
entail a substantial—possibly even a radical—overhaul of our current system of
organ procurement, which is rooted in organizations and practices designed to
coordinate and facilitate altruism.11 How easy it will be to graft financial
incentives onto the existing system is as yet hard to assess.12
I begin this article with a brief history of the restriction on payments to
sources of transplantable organs. I then turn to the arguments commonly
advanced against compensating organ sources and explain how they are
grounded in beliefs that range from the highly contestable to the demonstrably
wrong. Next, I address questions of institutional design, examining the most
popular compensation proposals, and offering preliminary assessments of their
promise and feasibility. I conclude with some thoughts about the relationship
between altruism and self-interest.
II
PROHIBITIONS ON PAYMENTS TO ORGAN SOURCES: HISTORY AND
BACKGROUND
Although a modern technology, organ transplantation arouses primitive
emotions.13 Incorporating parts of one person into another dissolves physical
boundaries in a way that for most of human history was the stuff of myth and
that contravenes customs and practices regarding treatment of the human
body.14 Not surprisingly, organ transplantation has elicited complicated

10. See Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at
37, 54 (detailing how “distaste for certain kinds of transactions can” constrain markets and urging
“economists and other proponents of legalizing kidney sales” to pay careful attention to the “sources of
repugnance” in crafting solutions to the organ shortage crisis); see also Leon Kass, Organs for Sale?
Propriety, Property and the Price of Progress, PUB. INT., Spring 1992, at 65, 84 (examining “hard-toarticulate intuitions and sensibilities” concerning organ sales).
11. See Kieran Healy, Altruism as an Organizational Problem: The Case of Organ Procurement, 69
AM. SOC. REV. 387, 393 (2004) (explaining how the altruism associated with organ donation is “highly
institutionalized” in that it is “structured, promoted, and made logistically possible by organizations and
institutions with a strong interest in producing it”).
12. See id. at 400 (emphasizing the limits of our knowledge about “the dynamics of procurement
over time or the way different parts of the organizational system interact with one another and with
individual donors”).
13. See LESLEY A. SHARP, STRANGE HARVEST: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, DENATURED BODIES,
AND THE TRANSFORMED SELF 1–2 (2006).
14. See Kass, supra note 10, at 73 (detailing the “presumptions and repugnances against treating
the human body in the ways that are required for organ transplantation”).
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reactions.15 Organ-procurement workers often struggle to convince organ
sources and their next of kin to overcome what is for many a strong, instinctive
aversion to organ harvest.16 That transplant professionals have substantially
succeeded in recasting as socially acceptable and even laudable what in any
other context would constitute desecration—or, in the case of living donors,
physical battery—is a testament to their thoughtfulness and sensitivity.17
The already fraught emotional climate surrounding organ transplantation is
exacerbated by fears that the demand for transplantable organs could lead to
the commodification of the human body, as “spare parts” are swapped for cash
and other valuable consideration.18 Anxiety over the prospect of markets in
human flesh helps explain Congress’s hasty passage in 1984 of the National
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).19 Enacted soon after a former physician
announced plans to set up a company to broker human kidneys,20 NOTA makes
it unlawful for any person to “knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer
any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if
the transfer affects interstate commerce.”21 Before NOTA’s passage, the legality
of organ purchases from sources or their survivors was unclear, although the
near-universal practice was that donors went unpaid.22 Transplantable organs
were often, for all practical purposes, treated not as the property of the original
holder or her survivors, but as that of the harvesting surgeons, who enjoyed
broad powers to allocate organs based on their clinical and ethical judgments.23
NOTA imposes a restriction on “valuable consideration,” but it is of limited
scope. NOTA excepts “reasonable payments associated with the removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and

15. See SHARP, supra note 13, at 2 (“Organ transplantation indisputably generates an unusual
combination of curiosity, celebration, and anxiety.”).
16. See id. at 56–73.
17. Cf. LESLEY A. SHARP, BODIES, COMMODITIES, AND BIOTECHNOLOGIES: DEATH,
MOURNING AND SCIENTIFIC DESIRE IN THE REALM OF HUMAN ORGAN TRANSFER 51–52 (2007)
(describing the work of procurement specialists).
18. See RENÉE C. FOX & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 64–72 (1992) (discussing the debate in the 1980s between medical societies and
health organizations arguing for proscription of organ commodification and public-policy analysts
advocating compensation for donors of bodily parts).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2006).
20. See Margaret Engel, Virginia Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e).
22. See James F. Childress, The Body as Property: Some Philosophical Reflections, 24
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2143 (1992); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for
Human Organs, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 57–86 (James F.
Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989).
23. See JEFFREY PROTTAS, THE MOST USEFUL GIFT: ALTRUISM AND THE PUBLIC POLICY OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 148 (1994) (“[T]he use [of organs] was in the surgeons’ hands, and decisions
regarding who received a transplant were dependent on the surgeons’ understanding of their ethical
responsibilities to their patients and their technical views on clinical matters. What consistency there
was . . . derived from the similarities of training and values to be found among transplant surgeons.”).
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storage” of human organs.24 Moreover, NOTA has never been interpreted to
limit the amount a hospital can charge a patient for a comprehensive package of
goods and services that includes a new organ.25 In essence, the effect of NOTA’s
compensation ban is to prohibit organ sources and their survivors from
receiving payment in exchange for consenting to organ harvest, not to prohibit
all transfers of organs in exchange for consideration. In short, NOTA prevents
only the most-obvious commerce in organs.
Along with restricting organ sales, NOTA effected major changes in organ
procurement and allocation. NOTA established the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN) and charged the new organization with
developing and administering a fair and equitable system of organ distribution.26
Under the terms of the statute, this unified, national transplant network must
be administered by a private, nonprofit entity under contract to the federal
government. Since 1986, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a
nonprofit organization based in Richmond, Virginia, has served as
administrator of the OPTN.27 Under the system created by NOTA and overseen
by UNOS, retrieval and transplantation of organs from deceased donors—who
generate approximately seventy-seven percent of transplanted organs28—is
coordinated by fifty-eight Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs), each of
which ministers to a particular, assigned geographic area.29 The duties of OPOs
include identifying potential organ donors, working with donor families to
answer questions about and obtain consent for organ recovery, and overseeing
the harvest and transportation of usable organs.30 OPOs also work to encourage
organ donation—including living donation—through public-education
campaigns.31 Through these activities, OPOs play an important role both in
fomenting and shaping public perceptions of the meaning of organ donation.32
The idea that consent to organ harvest constitutes a “gift of life” is a key theme

24. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e).
25. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 179–83.
26. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19–25.
27. United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
28. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, National Data Reports, http://www.optn.
org/latestData/step2.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
29. Id.; see also David H. Howard, Producing Organ Donors, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at 25,
26–27.
30. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 20–23. OPOs have significant financial
motivations for maximizing the number of organs harvested in their assigned areas. See Joan
McGregor, Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Recovery of Transplantable Organs After
Cardiac or Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ Donation, 2 PHIL.
ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. 8, 11 (2007).
31. See KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD
AND ORGANS 43–44 (2006).
32. See id. at 17 (detailing how blood- and organ-procurement organizations “create and sustain
their donor pools by providing opportunities to give and by producing and popularizing accounts of
what giving means”).
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of OPO communications and is credited with helping to overcome public
hesitation about organ donation.33
III
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROHIBITING SOURCE COMPENSATION
According to NOTA’s legislative history, Congress’s decision to restrict
organ sales stemmed from a conviction that human body parts must not become
commodities used to generate profits.34 Whether Congress failed to grasp that
NOTA’s prohibitions would fall short of totally eliminating commerce in
organs, or whether it simply made a pragmatic choice based on its judgment
that popular opinion equated compensation for sources with commerce in
organs, is uncertain. What is clear is that anticommodification rhetoric was front
and center in the deliberations over NOTA. The likely consequences of
commercial activity in organs, legislators averred, were dire. The Report of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives
concluded, “[T]here is strong evidence to suggest that permitting the sale of
human organs might result in the collapse of the nation’s system of voluntary
organ donation.”35 Noting that congressional investigation of the nation’s system
of organ procurement had uncovered a “number of instances of individuals
promoting the sale of kidneys between unrelated donors,” the Report cautioned
that, even though “it does not appear that any transactions have taken
place[,] . . . the mere existence of such proposals threatens the voluntary
donation system.”36 Congress was also influenced by expert testimony that
bodily materials purchased from sources posed greater health hazards than ones
acquired through gift.37
Although support for restrictions on payments to sources has recently begun
to wane, such restrictions have been vigorously defended since NOTA’s
enactment. Foes of financial incentives echo the findings and concerns
articulated by Congress in its consideration of NOTA: to pay organ sources
would inappropriately convert human body parts into objects of commerce; the
availability of compensation could drive out donations, reducing both the level
of altruism in society and the supply of organs; and organs obtained by payment
are less safe than donated ones. Opponents also express fears that paying
sources will increase the already high cost of transplantation and exploit the
poor and otherwise vulnerable.38

33. See id. at 25 (“[O]pposition to commodification can be traced in part to successful efforts to
convince the public that organ donation is a morally worthwhile act.”).
34. S. REP. NO. 98–382, at 2, 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976, 3978.
35. H.R. REP. NO. 98–575, at 22–23 (1983).
36. Id.
37. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 299 (1983) (statement of Bernard
Towers, Professor of Anatomy, Pediatrics and Psychiatry, UCLA Medical School).
38. See infra III.D–E.
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Yet upon examination, none of these arguments justifies a blanket
prohibition on financial incentives. Transplantable organs are already valuable
commodities, bought and sold for large sums; there is scant evidence that
payments to organ sources would crowd out altruistic transfers; and the refusal
to compensate sources of human biological materials is a poor proxy for safety.
Payments to organ sources, far from being automatically tacked on to
recipients’ medical charges, might actually reduce transplant costs. Finally, to
assume that compensated organ sources are prone to exploitation while
uncompensated sources are not is to fail to grasp the complexity of gift and
market transactions.
A. The Unsuitability of Commerce
Those who object to financial rewards tend to characterize the existing
regime as one of donative transfers and to suggest that compensation for organ
sources is inconsistent with the reigning “gift model.”39 But to frame the debate
over financial incentives in terms of whether organs will become commodities is
to misunderstand how organ transplantation operates. However appealing the
idea that generous impulses propel transplantable organs from original
possessor to ultimate recipient, the reality is that organs are continually
exchanged for valuable consideration. Only the first link in the distribution
chain is a gratuitous transferwhen the individual source agrees to make a
solid organ available for transplant. Subsequent transfers generally entail the
exchange of valuable consideration for rights to possess, use, and exclude others
from organs.40 Thus transplant programs pay organ-procurement organizations
for exclusive rights to organs, and then bundle the acquired body parts with
medical services for sale to patients, often at the maximum price the market will
bear.41 Although the claim is sometimes advanced that any payments made are
for services rendered, not for the actual organs, this distinction makes no sense.
No one would pay for organ transportation or transplant services that fail to
include an organ, just as there is no market for “dining services” that do not
include food.42
Refusing to compensate sources means not that organs are not commodities,
but that commodification begins after the initial transfer of rights.43 Put baldly,
the mix of both compensated and uncompensated transfers in the organdistribution chain results in a curious system in which a precious resource that
39. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12; see also MURRAY, supra note 3, at 120–
23.
40. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 180–84 (arguing that organs become marketable goods after
donation and are then sold to patients “as part of an indivisible package” by transplant programs).
41. See A.H. BARNETT & DAVID KASERMAN, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 89–98 (2002).
42. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 182–83.
43. Id.; see also SHARP, supra note 13, at 50 (“There is a national trade in transplantable human
organs in the United States and, once procured, organs are most certainly transformed into precious
commodities.”).
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starts out as a gift becomes an object of exchange. But far from being adjudged
illegal or immoral, purchases and sales of organs by procurement organizations,
hospitals, and other institutions engaged in transplantation are uncontroversial.
On first impression, this placid acceptance is baffling. If commercial activity in
human organs is so objectionable, why is the policy debate devoid of discussion
about how to stop it? A moment’s consideration yields the answer: To end
commerce in organs would require a complete transformation of the
distribution network so that nothing of value is exchanged for rights to possess
or use organs. Simply put, the distribution system could be comprised of
nothing but gratuitous transfers. Not even the most fervent opponent of
commerce in organs has endorsed such a departure from established practice.
Instead, trafficking in organs is tacitly accepted, and the sound and fury of the
debate over organ sales is directed at whether the first transfer of property
rights ought to be a donation or a sale.44
The absence of serious proposals to shut down commerce in transplantable
organs is both telling and poignant. Notwithstanding the distaste and disgust the
idea of profiting from human biological materials stirs, it is a truth universally
grasped—just not universally acknowledged—that forces of altruism alone are
unlikely to deliver organs to all those in critical need of transplants. The
inadequacy of altruism is due not only to a paucity of individual selflessness—
although it is hard to envision hospitals, physicians, and others who profit from
the organ business foregoing remuneration altogether—but to the formidable
information and coordination problems inherent in the organization of altruistic
activities.45
B. Would Financial Incentives Crowd Out Donations?
One response to the claim that organ sales are inevitable is that even if a
system devoid of the taint of market activity lies beyond our capabilities, surely
we prefer more generosity to less. Under this reasoning, a distribution chain
made up of a first, altruistic link followed by bargained-for exchanges is
superior to one in which money changes hands at every stage. If this is correct,
then payments to organ sources would cause societal harm if sales “crowd out”
donations, leading those who would have made organs available for free to
insist on compensation.46 To be convincing, however, this line of argument
would have to justify its assumption that more altruism is necessarily preferable

44. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 183–85 (explaining how the market functions in the distribution of
corneas).
45. Cf. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis, in
ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998)
(describing the difficulties of establishing and maintaining nonmarket resource-distribution networks).
46. See Gabriel M. Danovitch & Alan B. Leichtman, Kidney Vending: The “Trojan Horse” of
Organ Transplantation, 1 CLIN. J. AM. SOC. NEPHROLOGY 1133–35 (2006).

02_MAHONEY_BOOK PROOF.DOC

Summer 2009]

ALTRUISM, MARKETS, AND ORGAN PROCUREMENT

10/26/2009 1:49:45 PM

25

to less. Yet this assumption ignores the distributional and other consequences
of acts of altruism.47
A more extreme version of the “crowding out” argument—one which
Congress articulated in its deliberations over NOTA48—posits that the
availability of financial incentives might so disturb potential donors that many
will refuse to allow their organs to be harvested.49 Should that occur, introducing
financial incentives would cause not just inchoate, hard-to-measure harms such
as a reduction in generous sentiments in society, but also catastrophic loss of life
and damage to health. Opponents of financial incentives have invoked the
specter of a plunge in the organ supply as reason to refuse to undertake even
preliminary pilot programs.50
The chief problem with the “crowding out” line of argument is that—as
even its proponents admit—it is highly speculative.51 Evidence suggests that in
certain circumstances, offering rewards and punishments to encourage prosocial
behavior can backfire. That is, in some instances the presence of extrinsic
motivations can erode the willingness of individuals to provide goods or engage
in (or refrain from) particular actions.52 At the same time, there is also evidence
that in certain circumstances, external intervention can “crowd in” intrinsic
motivation—indeed, the notion that incentives fuel internal motivation enjoyed
wide currency in western thought in the sixteenth through nineteenth
centuries.53 Finally, it is entirely plausible that in many contexts, external
rewards and penalties will, as standard neoclassical economic theory predicts,
have no effect on intrinsic motivation.54 Whether a particular reward will

47. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 216–18.
48. See supra II.
49. See, e.g., Jeffrey Prottas, Buying Human Organs—Evidence That Money Doesn’t Change
Everything, 53 TRANSPLANTATION 1371 (1992); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note
6, at 11 (“[T]he relationship between financial payments and a willingness to donate may not conform
to the pattern that applies to ordinary consumer goods; payments may ‘crowd out’ other motivations,
and some families who would donate under an altruistic system may refuse to donate.”).
50. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 243 (“[I]f organ donation were to
become ‘commercialized’ because of the use of payments, some families who are willing to donate
under an altruistic system may refuse to provide consent . . . .”); id. at 259 (recommending against “the
use of financial incentives to increase the supply of transplantable organs . . . at this time”).
51. See, e.g., id. at 243 (acknowledging the lack of “scientific research bearing on the possibility that
legitimizing financial payments will crowd out nonfinancial motivations for organ donation or on
whether the problem could be reduced in a carefully regulated market”); Sheila Rothman & David
Rothman, The Hidden Cost of Organ Sale, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1524, 1525 (2006) (cataloging
experiments in which a crowding-out effect was found and conceding that “[n]one of these exercises are
without important methodological weaknesses”).
52. See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AMER. ECON. REV.
1652, 1654 (2006).
53. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL
MOTIVATION 24–25 (1997).
54. Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043, 1044
(1997); see also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 93–113 (1977) (detailing how Adam Smith’s
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“crowd out,” “crowd in,” or have a “crowding neutral” effect on internal
motivation is hard to predict.
The challenge of drawing on studies of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is
compounded by the fact that most situations in which researchers have detected
“crowding out” differ markedly from organ procurement. Well-known
examples of “crowding out” include a Swiss community where a proposal to
establish a nuclear-waste repository contingent on compensating all residents
garnered less support than a proposal to establish an identical facility without
compensation,55 an Israeli day-care center where the imposition of small fines
for late pick-ups resulted in more failures to collect children on time,56 and a
study of teenagers who solicited funds for disabled children, in which unpaid
subjects outperformed paid ones.57 It is unclear whether and to what degree we
can extrapolate from these situations to organ donation. One recent study of
Swedish, potential blood donors found, interestingly, a “crowding out” effect
for women but not for men.58 To date, this finding has not been replicated.
Moreover, even with fact patterns that bear some resemblance to organ
procurement, difficult questions arise concerning the relevance of the findings
to other situations and cultures.59 Until far more work is done, “crowding out”
must remain an interesting, but unconvincing, hypothesis. Although we cannot
dismiss it out of hand, in no way does the available evidence for “crowding out”
point to the conclusion that sweeping bans on donor compensation are sensible
policy.
C. Safety Concerns
The conviction that unpaid donors are safer sources of human tissue than
compensated ones gained wide currency in the early 1970s, when Richard
Titmuss published his seminal work, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood
to Social Policy. Comparing the blood-collection systems of the United States
and Great Britain, The Gift Relationship argued that the American practice of
using blood obtained from paid donors had deleterious health consequences for
blood recipients.60 Over the next two decades, a number of studies appeared
that lent credence to Titmuss’s assertion: paid blood sources admitted to more
risky behaviors and were infected with blood-borne diseases at a higher rate
vision of human motivation diverged from those of earlier thinkers who argued that monetary
incentives improved intrinsic motivation).
55. Frey, supra note 53, at 1047–48.
56. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–8 (2000).
57. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 792, 799–800
(2000).
58. Carl Mellstrom & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss
Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 845, 852–54 (2008).
59. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ
Transplantation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 478–79 (2008).
60. RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
142–57 (1970).
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than unpaid ones, and purchased blood was found to be more likely to transmit
hepatitis.61
But the safety question is a complicated one. For one thing, the failure to
pay sources is not a reliable proxy for human-tissue quality. Carefully chosen
and monitored groups of paid donors have yielded safe blood, while voluntary
donors have acted as vectors for HIV.62 Indeed, far from serving as a guarantor
of public welfare, the devotion of the U.S. blood industry to unpaid donors—a
policy instituted in the wake of The Gift Relationship—contributed to the
nation’s slow response to the emerging threat of AIDS.63 Another consideration
in assessing the safety implications of compensating organs sources is that if
financial incentives lead to a sufficient jump in the organ supply, transplant
programs will have more latitude to reject less-desirable organs. As a result, the
overall quality of transplanted organs could increase, resulting in health benefits
for organ recipients.64
D. Compensating Organ Sources and the Cost of Transplants
The claim that financial incentives will raise the cost of transplants flows
from the assumption that money or other valuable consideration offered to
organ sources constitutes an additional expense, one that will inevitably be
passed on to transplant recipients.65 By raising the price of an already expensive
procedure, the argument goes, compensation for organ sources would place
intolerable financial burdens on critically ill patients and possibly even reduce
access to transplants.
This line of thinking is flawed. First, paying organ sources may prove a
cheaper means of procuring organs than soliciting donations. Under the current
system, substantial sums are devoted to public-information campaigns and
other efforts to persuade potential donors to consent to organ harvest.66 With
financial incentives to donate, these “exhortation” costs will in all likelihood
fall. Whether the decline in exhortation costs will offset the total amount of
compensation paid is an empirical question, of course, but the key point is that
right now organ procurement is not cheap, even though organ sources go
unpaid. Second, far from making transplants less affordable, financial incentives
could decrease the cost of transplants. If financial rewards alleviate the organ
61. See Julia D. Mahoney & Pamela Clark, Property Rights in Human Tissue, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 144 (Donatella Porrini & Giovanni
Ramello eds., 2007).
62. HEALY, supra note 31, at 87–109.
63. Id.
64. See A.H. Barnett, R.D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Improving Organ Donation:
Compensation Versus Markets, 29 INQUIRY 178, 376 (1992).
65. Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial Incentives, 269 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 3113, 3116–17 (1993); Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in
Body Parts, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 262 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994).
66. See Emanuel D. Thorne, The Cost of Procuring Market-Inalienable Human Organs, 10 J. REG.
ECON. 191, 194–95 (1996).
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shortage, competition among transplant programs can be expected to increase,
as patients will have greater ability to choose among rival programs.67 One likely
avenue of competition is price. An increase in the supply of organs might also
enable transplant programs to operate more efficiently, leading to cost
reductions that could translate into consumer savings. Finally, even if monetary
incentives do increase the total cost of transplantation procedures, the
magnitude of the increase may be relatively modest.68
E. Exploitation of the Vulnerable
For all their recognized advantages, markets generate unease. It is feared
that bargained-for exchanges might lead not to mutual gain, but to the
flourishing of the strong either at the expense of the weak or with no
concomitant benefit for them. Such worries are especially acute in the area of
organ sales. Individuals willing to accept cash or other valuable consideration
for solid organs—particularly their own—might be in desperate financial or
emotional straits. To protect the vulnerable, many argue, the law should
prevent people from selling their organs, just as it protects workers—at least
some of the time—from dangerous, degrading, or extremely low-paid
occupational conditions. Advocates of freedom of contract disagree, and point
out that constraining the choices of prospective organ sellers might hurt rather
than help them.69 But even opponents of compensation bans are, in general,
hard-pressed to defend organ sales in ringing terms.
By contrast, gifts of organs tend to elicit favorable reactions. In the case of
organs obtained from the dead, donations are lauded as noble acts of
selflessness that allow something good to emerge from tragedy. Harvesting the
organs of deceased donors not only saves lives, but serves as a means of
memorializing the dead and comforting the bereaved.70 Attitudes toward living
donation are less rhapsodic, but still positive. Though it is recognized that
subjecting a healthy individual to significant short-term and long-term risks
raises grave ethical questions, both the transplant community and the broader
public support procuring organs from living donors.71 Many reform proposals
for living-donor practices call for improvements within the process of obtaining
informed consent and for more extensive studies of medical and other
consequences—but not for halting the use of living donors altogether.72

67. BARNETT & KASERMAN, supra note 41, at 20–23.
68. See Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and
Cadaveric Organ Donations, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at 3, 3 (concluding that financial incentive
schemes could “eliminate the large queues in the organ market . . . while increasing the overall cost of
transplant surgery by no more than about 12 percent”).
69. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 34–36 (1994).
70. HEALY, supra note 31, at 27–35.
71. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 263–77.
72. Id. at 270–77.
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Yet the assumption that offering to compensate organ sources necessarily
entails a greater danger of exploitation than soliciting donations is unfounded.
Both market and donative relationships exhibit great complexity, running the
full gamut from the mutually beneficial to the disempowering. It is wrong to
think that knowing whether a transfer of goods or services is paid or gratuitous
gives us full information about its meaning for those involved. Bargained-for
exchanges may forge interpersonal connections and solidify social
relationships—even intimate relationships.73 Acts of charity, on the other hand,
may underscore gaps in status and capabilities, creating or widening distances
between donors and recipients. In calculating risks of exploitation, it makes
sense to focus on the capacities and expectations of the partieswhat
information is conveyed and howand the organization and operation of
mediating institutions.74 Only then are we in a good position to judge the effects
of various regimes on organ sources.
Applied to the current system, such scrutiny stirs disquiet. Prospective organ
sources—some of whom would have a hard time obtaining transplants were
they in need, due to the “green screen” that can impede transplant access for
the insolvent and uninsured—are encouraged to donate so that organprocurement organizations, hospitals, and others can reap financial rewards.
This practice would be worrisome enough if donors were fully apprised of the
extent to which their gifts can generate financial bonanzas. That the information
furnished fails to disclose how lucrative the transplant business is only
compounds the unattractiveness of denying organ sources compensation while
neither urging nor expecting similar generosity from the others involved.
There is another, subtler concern. The insistence on altruistic procurement
means that potential organ sources confront a stark choice: donate or refuse to
help save a life. This constricted set of options is an anomaly in the realm of
charitable activity. In other contexts, individuals are afforded latitude to
balance altruistic projects—an important part of most lives—with the pursuit of
other goals.75 Thus a doctor may devote ten hours per week to treating the
indigent, just as the owner of a valuable painting may sell it to a museum for
less than the full market price. In neither case is the prospective altruist forced
either to give more than she feels capable of giving or not to give at all. Organ
sources are denied this freedom, even though it would be wholly
73. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 3 (2005) (rejecting the view that
“public policy must insulate household relations, personal care, and love . . . from an invading,
predatory, economic world” and analyzing “how all of us use economic activity to create, strengthen,
and renegotiate important ties”); see also Luke Dauter & Neil Fligstein, The Sociology of Markets, 33
ANN. REV. SOC. 105, 113 (2007) (detailing how many “market actors are involved in day-to-day social
relationships with one another, relationships built on trust, friendship, power and dependence”).
74. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 203, 211–31 (2008) (analyzing the interests and incentives of participants in markets for
parental rights).
75. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 215–20; see also Julia D. Mahoney, Should We Adopt a Market
Strategy to Increase the Supply of Transplantable Organs?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 73–76 (Wayne Shelton & John Balint eds., 2001).
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understandable for a prospective donor to prefer that his organs be made
available for transplant upon his death and that his survivors receive
compensation.
Insisting that organ sources either act out of pure altruism or forego
donation altogether raises particularly difficult issues when applied to living
donors. Although laws and regulations sometimes prohibit workers from
undertaking vocational risks, in a number of other contexts, individuals are
permitted to take dangerous jobs and to receive a “risk premium” on top of
normal wages as compensation for the perils they face.76 What is unheard of is to
refuse to pay workers for dangerous work, but to urge that they do it for free
instead on the grounds that their sacrifices would generate social value. Yet
this, in effect, is precisely what we pressure living donors to agree to. Denied
the chance to both do good by helping others and do well by enriching
themselves, prospective donors must choose from a truncated and
unsatisfactory menu.
IV
INSTITUTIONS AND COMPLEX MOTIVATIONS
That the arguments for refusing to compensate organ sources are
unpersuasive does not mean that instituting financial rewards would necessarily
prove to be a good policy choice. Introducing financial incentives raises
significant challenges, not least among them overcoming the potential hostility
of procurement professionals, bioethicists, and others who fiercely espouse the
principle of altruistic donation. Compounding such resistance are formal and
informal constraints on financial incentives.77 Removing, modifying, or declining
to enforce the formal constraints—that is, the laws and regulations prohibiting
compensation for organ sources—will not automatically dissolve the informal
constraints of organizational practice and social norms.
That said, there is reason to suspect that informal institutional limits on
financial incentives are malleable.78 At the very least, some forms of financial
incentives might prove both effective and acceptable. But, in assessing potential
institutional modifications, we are hampered by our limited knowledge of how
societal attitudes change. Another stumbling block is our rudimentary
understanding of the organizational framework that encourages and supports
altruism in the context of organ donation.79

76. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912,
1913–14 (1993).
77. Cf. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 4 (1990) (distinguishing between formal institutions consisting of “rules that humans
devise” and informal institutions such as “conventions and codes of behavior”).
78. See SHARP, supra note 13, at 244 (examining the culture of organ procurement and suggesting
that “the bedrock of an assumed gift economy has already eroded”).
79. See Healy, supra note 11, at 387–90.
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It is worthwhile to examine the four most prominent financial-incentive
proposals and assess their feasibility. Any such analysis is necessarily
preliminary, for the long-standing, strict proscriptions against compensating
organ sources make it hard to predict how procurement organizations and
professionals, prospective donors, the general public, and others will react to
policy innovations.80
A. Rewarded Gifts
One approach to introducing financial incentives is to provide compensation
but claim that the donative framework remains intact.81 Instead of being labeled
a “sale,” a transaction that involves the exchange of something valuable for
consent to organ harvest will be termed a “gift,” albeit a rewarded one. By
avoiding the language of the market, or so the reasoning goes, this approach
will allow both the transplant community and the general public to regard
compensating organ sources as a slight modification of current procedure rather
than as a substantial innovation. Careful word choice will thus enable financial
rewards to gain acceptance by salving the feelings of those who are put off by
the notion of body parts as commodities. In this context—as in so many
others—euphemism can function as a social emollient.
This scheme has the powerful advantage of requiring the least institutional
modification. Organ Procurement Organizations, hospital staff, and others
involved in obtaining consent to harvest deceased organs could continue to
solicit “gifts of life” in much the same way as before. Public-service campaigns
and other efforts to encourage living organ donation could proceed largely
unchanged.
At the same time, “rewarded gift” proposals stir serious misgivings. For one
thing, characterizing as a gift what may fairly be described as a sale is
disingenuous, if not outright deceptive. In recent decades, medicine has claimed
to embrace the values of truthfulness, fair dealing, and transparency.82 A
method of organ procurement that entails anything less than full disclosure of
all material facts is in profound tension with these ideals. There are practical
dangers as well. If prospective donors and the public reject the distinction
between “an incentive of material value and a payment for organs,”83 the upshot
could be serious reputational harm for the transplant profession with no
concomitant benefit of increasing the organ supply.
Finally, if potential donors do believe that what is on offer is in fact a gift
rather than a sale, the “rewarded gift” approach may fail to increase the organ
80. See Howard, supra note 29, at 30–32.
81. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 247–48 (detailing proposals to offer
financial rewards that are intended to “function within the gift model” and to avoid undermining the
belief that “organs are donated rather than sold”).
82. See generally THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (2001).
83. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 248.
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supply. The reason to supplement opportunities to donate with financial
rewards, after all, is to tap into various human motivations: just as altruists will
not respond to offers of payment, so nonaltruists cannot be expected to be
moved by appeals to generosity.84 But if nonaltruists fail to grasp that what is
offered is in fact compensation—not just another chance to be generous—they
will not respond.
B. Designated Compensation
Another option—one that, like the “rewarded gift” approach, aims to
realize the benefits of financial rewards while keeping at bay an obvious, fullblown market in solid organs—is to require that compensation be devoted to
particular purposes. Stipends for funeral expenses and donations to charity have
been suggested as appropriate uses for money paid to organ sources.85 Other
forms of compensation, including payment of medical expenses or insurance
premiums, are also possibilities.
Designated compensation is, in some respects, promising. Members of the
transplant community and broader public who are uncomfortable with
unrestricted cash payments for organs may find designated-compensation
schemes more palatable, simply because (in their minds) some good
consequences are guaranteed to flow from the transactions. In addition,
designated compensation might be deemed unobjectionable—or less
objectionable than unconstrained compensation—on the grounds that the
motives of those receiving the money are more admirable than the motives of
those willing to accept flat-out payment. Individuals who have pledged to
devote the proceeds to health, education, or the burials of loved ones inspire
sympathy and respect in a way that those free to spend the money to drink and
gamble do not. Another possible benefit of designated compensation is its
effect on potential donors. It is plausible—although of course uncertain—that a
significant fraction of donors who hesitate to accept unrestricted funds would
agree to make organs available if it is clear to others (and also, possibly,
themselves) that they will use the money for socially admired purposes.
There are drawbacks to designated compensation. First, the conceptual and
logistical challenges are daunting. What considerations will determine what the
recipients of compensation may spend the money on? What measures will
organizations charged with administering payment programs take to ensure that
funds are not diverted to unapproved uses? What remedies will be invoked if
recipients of funds fail to comply with conditions? It seems unlikely that
organizations that dispense funds would be willing to sue recipients. As yet,
these and other hard questions remain for the most part unaddressed. Another
84. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 349–51 (1972).
85. See L.A. Siminoff & M.D. Leonard, Financial Incentives: Alternatives to the Altruistic Model of
Organ Donation, 9 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 250, 253 (1999); see also Howard, supra note 29, at
31 (“The form and presentation of payment can help to mitigate against crowding out of altruistic
donations.”).
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concern is that designated compensation might be construed as suggesting that
organ sources and their survivors cannot be trusted to make sound decisions
about how to spend money. If that is correct, then limiting compensation to
particular uses risks insulting organ sources.
C. Unrestricted Payments for Organs from Deceased Donors
A more controversial proposal is to offer unrestricted payments for organs
of deceased donors. Funds could be disbursed directly to survivors or to the
decedent’s estate and distributed in accordance with testamentary instructions
or applicable intestacy laws. Alternately, living individuals could sell rights to
harvest organs upon death, in the event they are eligible donors.86 In any case,
recipients would be free to use the money for any purpose.
Unlike rewarded gifts or designated compensation, this approach does not
skirt the issue whether the first link of the organ distribution chain will include
commercial activity. As such, unrestricted payments to deceased donors have
the virtue of honesty. The transparency of the significant shift in social practice
has the added benefit of signaling to potential donors that compensation is now
on offer. Consequently, this approach may be a highly effective means of
incentivizing nonaltruists to make organs available for transplant. It is also
possible that this approach will meet with public approval on fairness grounds.
Recent stories in the mainstream media about transfers of human biological
materials have detailed how, in many transactions involving human tissue,
everyone but the human source profits.87 If these narratives take hold in the
public consciousness, then extending the opportunities to share in the financial
gains made possible by organ harvest may strike many as simple justice. Above
all, straightforward economic analysis indicates that monetary incentives would
increase the organ supply.88
But for all its appeal, the unrestricted-payment approach carries significant
hazards. Vociferous and long-standing insistence that organ transplantation
operates entirely within the “gift model” may lead procurement professionals
and others who promote donation to resist the transition to a regime that
solicits both donations and sales. To be sure, such a transition is by no means
inconceivable, especially in light of the fact that other nonprofit organizations—
for example, art museums—both purchase and receive invaluable goods as
donations. But although the culture of organ procurement is in many respects
one of change and innovation,89 it is impossible to say with confidence what the
reaction would be.

86. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 32–36.
87. See, e.g., Jeremy Laurance, Surgeon: Organ Trade Should Be Legalised, THE INDEPENDENT,
June 13, 2008, at 10.
88. See Becker & Elias, supra note 68, at 9 (concluding that payments would “help close the gap
between [the] quantity supplied and [the] quantity demanded” of organs).
89. See SHARP, supra note 13, at 242 (describing the shifts in “labels, rhetorical phrases, and
attitudes” among procurement workers).
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Even if transplant professionals come to embrace payments for organs, the
problem of popular acceptance remains, for the “gift paradigm” might exert a
strong hold on the public mind.90 Should public support fail to materialize, it is
by no means certain that efforts by government entities or procurement
organizations to inculcate it will succeed. If nothing else, our experience with
information campaigns aimed at convincing the public to become organ donors
has taught us that modifying preferences is no easy task.91 Finally, we cannot
dismiss as preposterous the warnings of adherents of the “crowding out”
hypothesis, that explicit payments could trigger such a backlash that prospective
sources would refuse to donate—let alone sell—organs, decimating the organ
supply.92 Although the probability of such a catastrophe is unlikely to be very
high, policymakers may be unwilling to chance it.
D. Unrestricted Compensation for Living Donors
Allowing unrestricted compensation for living donors has many of the same
advantages as unrestricted payments for deceased organs, most notably, frank
acknowledgement of the departure from the gift framework and a solid
likelihood of motivating a substantial number of nonaltruists to make organs
available.93 Also in common with payments for organs acquired from the dead,
compensating living donors may fail to increase the organ supply due to lack of
enthusiasm among transplant workers and the general public—or even have the
perverse effect of reducing the organ supply.
There are some key differences. Living organ sources are subject to physical
and mental health risks, many of which are of uncertain character and
magnitude.94 If the availability of compensation boosts the number of living
donors—which, after all, is its goal—the result will be more death and disability
among organ sources. Living donors may also suffer the detrimental financial
consequences of lost wages and trouble obtaining affordable health and
disability insurance.95 Moreover, the negative consequences of living donation
extend beyond harms to donors. Physicians and other health-care workers often
suffer due to the ethical quandaries posed by operating on healthy individuals.
However worthy the motivation for removing organs from living donors,
surgery that is not intended to help the patient conflicts with the primum non
nocere (first do no harm) principle.96 Compensating living donors does have one
90. See Howard, supra note 29, at 30–32.
91. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 187–99 (recounting the limited success
of efforts to increase altruism).
92. See supra III.B.
93. See Becker & Elias, supra note 68, at 21–22.
94. See J.R. Inglefinger, Risks and Benefits to the Living Donor, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 447, 447
(2005) (stating that although physical and emotional risks for the living donor remain, the risks are now
better understood).
95. See R.S. Brown & M.W. Russo, Financial Impact of Adult Living Donation, 9 (10) LIVER
TRANSPLANTATION (SUPPLEMENT 1) S12, S14 (2003).
96. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 263–64.
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distinct advantage over payments for deceased organs, though: it does not
contravene the strong social norms against profiting from the sale of the corpses
of loved ones.
Implementing a system of compensation for living donors would in some
respects be simple. Already, those in need of organs and potential organ
providers generally deal directly with one another in arranging for altruistic
transfer. For the most part, these nonmediated arrangements involve donors
and recipients who are closely related, although some pair strangers with
recipients whose plight is publicized through social-networks’ media stories or
internet appeals.97 To add the option of payment would not require the
cooperation of any of the organizations that operate as facilitators and
fomenters of altruism. Compensation for living donors would, however, entail
the elimination or non-enforcement of formal restrictions, as well as the
revision of social norms. These norms are particularly strong in the context of
familial and intimate relationships, in which explicit, bargained-for exchanges
are often viewed as problematic.98
V
CONCLUSION
Formal restrictions on financial incentives for organ sources were put in
place decades ago. Imposed in haste and without careful analysis of the
complexities of gift and market relationships, these prohibitions have long been
justified as measures to prevent the commodification of the human body, to
protect public health, and to shield the vulnerable from exploitation. In fact,
bans on payments to organ sources accomplish none of these goals. Instead, the
stubborn commitment to wholly altruistic procurement has resulted in a curious
system, one in which individuals are exhorted to donate rights to valuable goods
that are then sold to generate profits for others.
The weaknesses in the arguments for refusing to pay organ sources suggest
that the system is ripe for transformation. But here we must tread carefully, for
changing organ transplantation entails more than revising formal laws and
regulations. Also vital are the constraints imposed by social custom and
organizational practice. Our understanding of how these constraints evolve—
much less how to foster societal and institutional transformation—is as yet
limited.

97. The vast majority of living donors are family members of recipients. See Organ Procurement
and Transplant Network, 2007 Annual Report of the OPTN and SRTR, available at http://www.optn.
org/data/annualReport.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
98. See generally ZELIZER, supra note 73.

